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SECTION I
INTRODUCTION
1.1 PURPOSE
This document is one of several volumes which list and describe all of the
operational equipment facilities required at Kennedy Space Center to con-
duct Shuttle operations, including early developmental testing.
1.2 AUTHORITY
KSC (SP-OPN) has been assigned the task of developing the Station Set
Requirements Documents by the Shuttle Program Manager.
1.3 SCOPE
Each document is limited to a single "station set" - an accumulation of
equipment at a particular site or the equipment required to support a
specific function. The requirements described in the document are
determined by continual review of all available planning paper, contractor
proposals, preliminary design drawings, system and CEI specifications
concept studies and miscellaneous other sources such as meetings and
presentations. An iterative process between KSC, MSFC, and JSC will
result in gradual refinement and amplification of the data. As a result
of this process of review and conmment, each -tation set volume will be
revised periodically by a team of designated representaLives from
cognizant KSC organizations until a firm baseline of requirements is
achieved. Ultimately it is expected that final design/procurement action
will be initiated to provide the equipment/facilities described.
1.4 REVISION CONTROL
This document will be revised as requirements become better defined or
as they change.
IS-PEM 1 August 28, 1973
FIRE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS
Facility/GSE Station Set #82
Responsibilities
The team will be responsible for establishing, documenting and updating
detail fire prevention/protection requirements for all Shuttle facility
and ground support equipment.
The team will also be responsible for establishing and documenting
methods, identifying personnel, equipment, and apparatus required to
facilitate the rescue and/or recovery of personnel involved in mishaps
or potential mishap.
Fire prevention/protection analysis includes consideration of equipment
facility features that prevent loss of life or personal injury; prevent
loss of installed or stored equipment of material of critical signifi-
cance to the Shuttle mission, of high monetary value or that which can
only be replaced with difficulty or delay; prevent loss of buildings
and facilities; and prevent loss of community property and public
confidence.
FUNCTIONAL FLOW DESCRIPTION
FUNCTIONAL FLOW DESCRIPTION
Fire support is included as an integrated portion of each station set to
provide each station set chairman with requirements for fire prevention
and protection that is necessary for the protection of life and property
for that particular building, facility or operation.
Fire prevention activites in the Shuttle program will be a continuing
daily operation encompassing all facilities, buildings, and personnel at
the Kennedy Space Center.
Fire Services provides personnel and apparatus to perform rescue and fire
suppression, supporting the various operations required to process the
(rbiter from touchdown at the landing site through the Orbiter Processing
Facility, Hypergol Maintenance Facility, Shuttle Vehicle Assembly Building
to launch.
Book 2 of Volume 82, Fire Support, has been developed to recognize the
haardous operations involved in preparing the Shuttle orbiter for launch;
launch operation; landing operations; safing operations; and all other
off-line associated operations.
Fire Services personnel are required to provide fire suppression/rescue
services during most of the hazardous operations and in the facilities
where the operations are conducted.
The following are set forth as individual sections:
A. Orbiter Landing Operations
B. Convoy From Landing Site to OPF
C. Orbiter Processing Facility
D. Shuttle Vehicle Assembly Building
E. Launch Complex Activities
F. Launch
G. Off-Line Hypergol Maintenance Facility Operations
H. Associated Off-Line Activities
FIRE SERVICES SUPPORT FUNCTION
Flight Crew Rescue
Landing Fire Suppression
Site Orbiter Safeing
Towing to Orbiter Processing Facility
Orbiter Rescue/Fire Suppression
Processing Orbiter Safeing Operations
Facility .Cryo Deservicing
.Hypergol Deservicing
.T.P.S. Operations
Hypergol Rescue/Fire .Payload Removal/Installation
Servicing Suppression
Facility Hypergol Operations
Rescue/Fire Suppression
Shuttle Stacking
Vehicle .External Tank
Assembly .Solid Rocket Booster
. OrbiterSolid 
.Ordnance Installation
Rocket Rescue/Fire Suppression .Rol lout
Booster
Facility
Rescue
.Ground Crews
Launch .Flight Crews
Pad Rescue/Fire Suppression
.Payload Operations
.Hypergol Pod Installation
.Hypergol Loading
.Cryo Loading
Launch
AORBITER LANDING INCIDENTS
ORBITER LANDING INCIDENTS
SOn Landing Strip - Kennedy Space Center
A. Normal Rollout:
1. A fire Services officer and three major pieces
of manned crash equipment will be on-station
along runway for manned orbiter landings. One
piece of equipment at each of the following
runway positions: orbiter touchdown point;
center point; and positioned where orbiter will
complete rollout.
2. All vehicles will be positioned on hard surface
access routes with a minimum two minute response
capability anywhere on the strip. Emergency
equipment will be located back from the runway
in event the craft should veer due to a collapsed
gear or blowout.
3. As orbiter passes each station point, the equip-
ment will fall in behind craft and follow to
rollout.
4. All vehicles will position near the cabin access
hatch and the aero-stand positioned for crew
egress. After egress, safeing operations will
be undertaken.
ORBITER LANDING INCIDENTS
SOn Landing Strip - Kennedy Space Center
B. Orbiter engages arresting gear on rollout and
there is no fire:
1. The responding officer and emergency equipment
will position at the cabin access hatch and the
aero-stand will be positioned for crew egress.
2. Emergency crews with charged hose lines will
guard against fires due to hot brakes, ruptured
fuel or hydraulic lines, gears collapsing due
to their weakening upon engagement of barrier,
toxic vapor exposure or any other hazardous
occurrence. The fan vehicle will be utilized to
disperse toxic vapors away from the crew.
3. After crew egress has been accomplished and the
fire officer has determined no fire or explosion
hazards are imminent, measures to complete safeing
the craft will be continued.
ORBITER LANDING INCIDENTS
SOn Landing Strip - Kennedy Space Center
C. Orbiter goes through arresting gear and there
is no fire:
1. The responding officer and emergency equipment
will position (terrain permitting) at the cabin
access hatch with the aero-stand positioned for
crew egress. If the hatch is jammed due to
barrier impact or any other reason, forcible
entry will be initiated.
2. Emergency crews with charged hose lines will
guard against fires due to hot brakes, ruptured
fuel or hydraulic lines, eectrical shorts,
damaged gears collapsing, toxic vapor exposure,
or any other hazardous situation that may arise.
The fan vehicle will be used to disperse toxic
vapors away from crews.
3. After crew egress has been accomplished (emergency
crew assisting if needed) and the fire officer has
determined no fire or explosive hazard is imminent,
measures to move the craft to the safeing area can
be undertaken.
ORBITER LANDING INCIDENTS
SOn Landing Strip - Kennedy Space Center
D. Orbiter goes into canal or waterway:
1. If the crew section of orbiter is out of or
above the surface of the water, the responding
officer and emergency crew will position (ter-
rain permitting) near the cabin access hatch
with charged hose lines to guard against fire
due to ruptured hydraulic or fuel lines, elec-
trical shorts, or any other hazardous occurrence.
2. A means of egress for the crew will be provided
taking precautions against anyone immersing any
art of their body in water which may be con-
aminated with hypergolics.
3. The ground crew will recover the craft after
crew egress and the fire officer has determined
there is no imminent danger of fire or explosion.
NOTE: If the craft is suspended above the water and it
cannot be determined if the gears are stable or
intact, emergency crews should be aware that the
craft may be floating as a result of trapped air
pockets. An attempt to open the craft above the
waterline may result in the air escaping, causing
the orbiter to move or become submerged, trapping
the crew.
4. If the crew section is submerged and it can be
determined that it is intact and water-tight,
the emergency crew will attempt entry by cutting
into skin of orbiter to the rear of the crew
compartment at a point above the surface of the
water.
ORBITER LANDING INCIDENTS
SOn Landing Strip - Kennedy Space Center
D. Orbiter goes into canal or waterway: (cont)
5. Crew egress may be accomplished from this point,
avoiding any contaminates that may be in the
water.
6. If crew section is not intact, recovery will be
accomplished as the situation dictates. Scuba
divers may have to be used, or it may be feasible
to remove the cabin section by the use of tugs or
lifts, all dependent upon the life hazard.
ORBITER LANDING INCIDENTS
I. On Landing Strip - Kennedy Space Center
E. Orbiter goes through canal and into brush:
1. If the oribter is involved in fire, which is
highly probable, the situation will be handled
as outlined in the procedure dealing with fire
in Item I.
2. If no fire, the responding officer and emergency
equipment will position as near the cabin access
hatch as terrain permits. If hatch is jammed
due to terrain impact, forcible entry will be
initiated with emergency crews in position with
charged hose lincs guarding against fires result-
ing from broken fuel or hydraulic lines, elec-
trical shorts, landing gears torn loose and
penetrating fuel tanks, toxic vapor exposure or
any other hazard that might occur.
3. The flight crew will egress as soon as possible
with the emergency crew assisting as needed or
directed.
4. After egress of the flight crew, and the fire
officer has determined that is no imminent fire
or explosive hazard, the ground crew may then
accomplish recovery of the craft for safeing.
ORBITER LANDING INCIDENTS
. On Landing Strip - Kennedy Space Center
F. Collapsed Nose Gear:
1. If this should happen, the craft would be in a
"tail-high" position with the nose down. If
there is a fire, the responding officer will
direct the emergency crews to take position on
the nose of the orbiter and follow the procedure
as outlined in Item I.
2. If no fire, the responding officer and equipment
will position as near the cabin access hatch as
possible, and the aero-stand will be set up for
crew egress while emergency crews with charged
hose lines guard against fires resulting from
ruptured hydraulic or fuel lines, electrical
shorts, hot brakes or any other hazardous occur-
rence. The fan vehicle will be used for toxic
vapor dispersal.
3. The ground crew may safe craft for towing after
crew egress and the fire officer has determined
that no imminent hazard of fire or explosion
exists.
ORBITER LANDING INCIDENTS
SOn Landing Strip - Kennedy Space Center
G. Collapsed Main Gear:
1. With no fire,.the responding fire officer and
emergency crews will take the same action as
outlined in the procedure for a collapsed nose
gear. Special consideration will be given to
the possibility of the gear penetrating the
skin of the orbiter and causing fires from the
rupturing of fuel tanks, hydraulic or fuel lines,
electrical shorts, and toxic vapor release.
ORBITER LANDING INCIDENTS
SOn Landing Strip - Kennedy Space Center
H. Tire Blows Out:
1. The release of tire pressure will reduce the
pressure on the wheel and eliminate the possi-
bility of explosion. This would be under the
assumption that the tire had blown from reasons
other than hot brakes or wheel fires such as
impact on landing.
a. The responding fire officer will direct a
predetermined crew to take position at the
point of failure, guarding against further
hazards while the remaining emergency crews
and aero-stand will be positioned at the
cabin access hatch to assist in crew egress
as needed.
2. If tire failure is imminent due to fire in the
brakes or wheel assembly, no attempt should be
made to evacuate the crew. Fire of this type
can cause a combination of increased tire pres-
sure and weakening of the metal parts by the
heat which may cause an explosion. The explosion
may cause severe concussion, sending metal and
pieces of tire hurtling through the air at great
speed.
a. The responding fire officer will direct a
predetermined crew to pull their apparatus
into an effective fire fighting range, a
position that will enable them to attack
from the rear or front of the wheel, and
then begin extinguishment with suitable
agents.
ORBITER LANDING INCIDENTS
SOn Landing Strip - Kennedy Space Center
H. Tire Blows Out - (Cont)
b. Upon determination by the fire officer that
the explosive hazard no longer exists, the
remainder of the emergency crews will take
positon at the cabin access hatch, set up
the aero-stand and assist with crew egress
if needed.
c. Upon completion of egress, ground crews can
ready orbiter for towing.
ORBITER LANDING INCIDENTS
SOn Landing Strip - Kennedy Space Center
I. Fire Occurs:
1. The primary objective is rescue of the flight
crew, and all operations will be accomplished
in the most expeditious manner to effect rescue.
2. The responding fire officer and emergency crews
will take position on the hose of the craft so
that both sides of the fuselage and crew com-
artment can be kept cool. A rescue path will
e established by directing cooling streams in
the area of the crew compartment, working from
the fuselage outward to open a path through the
heated area so rescue exits can be established.
3. Extreme caution will be exercised by emergency
crews due to hypergolic fuel on board the craft.
The fan vehicle will be used to disperse toxic
vapors away from the rescue path. All personnel
will don self-contained breathing apparatus prior
to entering the fire area.
4. After crew egress/evacuation, total extinguishing
efforts will be taken.
ORBITER LANDING INCIDENTS
SOn Landing Strip - Kennedy Space Center
J. Explosion Occurs:
1. If explosion occurs, again the main objective
is rescue of the flight crew. The responding
fire officer and emergency crews will use heavy
turret streams in the area of the explosions,
and establish a rescue path into the area of the
crew compartment.
2. The procedure as outlined for occurring fires
will be followed. The explosive hazards will
be isolated with large volumes of cooling and
extinguishing agents.
3. The ground crews may ready craft for removal
after flight crew egress/evacuation and overall
extinguishment has been accomplished.
ORBITER LANDING INCIDENTS
SOn Landing Strip - Kennedy Space Center
K. Fuel or Hydraulic Rupture:
1. If possible, broken fuel or hydraulic lines will
be crimped or plugged to reduce the amount of
spill or extent of fire.
2. Rupture of a fuel tank where large volumes of
fuel are involved: The method of control and
disposal will be dependent upon the degree of
flammability, toxicity, and explosive hazard
of the fuel.
3. The fire officer will take precautions against
mixtures of flammables and explosive mixtures
of vapors and air from igniting. The fan vehicle
will be used for dissipating this type of mixture.
ORBITER LANDING INCIDENTS
SOn Landing Strip - Kennedy Space Center
L. Toxic Vapor Exposure:
1. The fire officer and emergency crews responding
to all incidents will take the utmost precautions
against toxic vapors.
2. The fan vehicle will be positioned so that vapors
will be dispersed away from the flight crew upon
egress.
3. Emergency crews required to respond to any inci-
dent will be equipped with self-contained
breathing apparatus and full protective clothing.
4. All personnel and equipment operating in these
areas will be washed down prior to leaving the
area.
5. Personnel exposed to toxic vapors will be admin-
istered inmmnediate first aid and transported to
the Medical Facility.
ORBITER LANDING INCIDENTS
SOn Landing Strip - Kennedy Space Center
M. Combustible Metal Fires:
1. The responding fire officer will direct the
emergency crews to use and apply the appropriate
extinguishing agents to confine, control, and
extinguish metal fires.
2. In case of a wheel fire on the craft, the plan
as outlined in Item "H" will be used, taking care
not to expose anyone to the hazard of tire
explos ion.
3. Large metal fires w.ill be combated using copiousquantities of water.
ORBITER LANDING INCIDENTS
SOn Landing Strip - Kennedy Space Center
N. Orbiter Turn Over:
1. In case of turn over, the possibility of injury
and fire is high. The procedure as outlined in
Item "I" will be followed with forcible entry
initiated as required.
2. In no fire incidents, the same basic procedure
will be followed, except that instead of fighting
the fire, fuel spills will be treated as outlined
in Item "K", with charged hose lines ready in the
event of fire.
3. The fan vehicle will be used to disperse toxic
vapors away from personnel.
ORBITER LANDING INCIDENTS
SOn Landing Strip - Kennedy Space Center
0. Wing or Tail Section Off:
1. If there is fire, the procedure as outlined in
Item "I" will be followed.
2. The fan vehicle will be used to disperse any
toxic vapor hazard away from crew egress rescue
paths.
3. The aero-stand will be positioned for crew egress
with emergency crews assisting as required.
4. In no fire incidents, the same basic procedure
will be followed, except that instead of fighting
fire, charged hose lines will be ready in the
event of fire.
ORBITER LANDING INCIDENTS
SOn Landing Strip - Kennedy Space Center
P. Reduced Visibility:
1. The fire officer and emergency crews responding
to incidents under reduced visibility will use
extreme caution when approaching orbiter.
2. A predesignated crew manning the equipment vehicl
will immediately set up emergency lights while re
maining personnel take action applicable to the
situation.
ORBITER LANDING INCIDENTS
SOn Landing Strip - Kennedy Space Center
Q. Battery Incident Aboard Orbiter:
1. The fire officer and responding emergency crews
will position at the cabin access hatch and set
up the aero-stand.
2. After flight crew egress from the craft, the emer-
gency crew, equipped with Met-L-X extinguishers,
battery coffin, battery handling tools, and self-
contained breathing apparatus will proceed to the
battery location.
3. Battery will be placed in coffin, transported to
aero-stand, and sent to ground level.
NOTE: Personnel will not ride down with battery.
4. Upon arrival at ground level, the battery will be
removed from aero-stand and transported with
minimum exposure to all personnel, to a predeter-
mined area via an appropriate vehicle.
5. Upon arrival, battery will be removed from coffin
and placed on ground. Area will be roped off and
shaded from sun.
6. Battery will be left in area until it has been
declared safe by appropriate personnel.
ORBITER LANDING INCIDENTS
SOn Landing Strip - Kennedy Space Center
R. Wheels. Up Landing:
1. Outbreak of fire is extremely likely due to fuel
lines and tanks being ruptured by scraping of
the lower part of the craft on the ground, and
the tremendous heat and sparks which are generated.
2. The responding fire officer and emergency crew
will make an immediate attack to keep the fire
clear of the fuselage and crew compartment.
3. The fan vehicle will be positioned to disperse
toxic vapors away from rescue paths and aero-
stand will be set up for crew egress.
4. Emergency crew will use forcible entry if hatch
is jammed, and assist flight crew in egress if
required.
5. After egress/evacuation is accomplished, total
extinguishing efforts will be taken.
6. After the fire officer has determined there is
no imminent explosive or fire hazard remaining,
the orbiter will be readied for towing.
ORBITER LANDING INCIDENTS
SOn Landing Strip - Kennedy Space Center
S. High Impact Crash:
1. Consideration must be given to the condition
and location of the wreakage and the hazard
it creates. A different attack position is
required if the craft has broken open or is
upside down, fragmented, or intact.
2. The fire officer will determine the apparatus
position applicable to the situation.
3. This type crash normally carries a high fatality
rate to the crew. Rescue is improbable and fire
control is sought principally to protect expo-
sures and preserve evidence to aid investigators
in determining the cause of the accident.
ORBITER LANDING INCIDENTS
Ferry Flight
Orbiter Mated to Ferry Aircraft
.1. On Landing Strip - Kennedy Space Center
T. Normal rollout - problem indicated on orbiter after ferry
stops.
1. A Fire Services. officer and three major pieces of manned
crash equipment will be on-station along runway for
manned orbiter landings. One piece of equipment at each
of the following runway positions: aircraft touchdown
point; center point; and positioned where aircraft will
complete rollout. For all ferry flights, the 85' Snorkel
will normally be positioned at the southern end of the
runway on orbiter toway, or at other locations along runway
as necessary.
2. All vehicles will be positioned on hard surface access
route.s with a minimum two minute response capability
anywhere on the strip. Emergency equipment will be
located back from the runway in event the craft should
veer due to a collapsed gear or blowout.
3. As aircraft passes- each station point, the equipment
will fall in behind craft and follow to rollout. When
aircraft stops, the Snorkel will move from standby point
to aircraft location.
4. All vehicles will position near the aircraft and the aero-
stand positioned for crew egress.
5. Officer-will have the Snorkel positioned and raised with
personnel and extinguishing agent to access hatch of
orbiter. Hatch opened, entrance made, problem taken care
.by fire personnel, if fire problem: Assistance given to
contractor personnel as necessary if other than fire problem.
Snorkel (Hydraulic Platform)
Work Height: 85' Platform Capability: 700 lbs
Horizontal Reach: 50' 1000 GPM Monitor
Breathing air available, 440 cu. ft., with 100' hard line masl
First Aid Kit
Extinguishing agents available:
Booster lines from crash/rescue apparatus; water; C02;
dry powder; Halon
Portable Fire Extinguishers
HAZARDS
ORBITER LANDING
1. Toxic and flammable gases in area of orbiter due to ammonia boiler,
auxiliary propulsion unit still active during reentry and rollout
until shutdown at end of rollout. Possible hypergol vapors near
attitude control and maneuvering units.
SHUTTLE ORBITER LANDING HAZARDOUS
FLUID RESIDUAL IN GALLONS
RESERVES RESIDUALS MAXIMUM
SYSTEM (GALS.) (GALS.) TOTAL
Propulsion -- Auxiliary
Oxidizer
Maneuver N204 19.835 19.835
Attitude Control N204 32.25 2.0835 34.166
Fuel
Maneuver MMH 19.1424 19.1424
Attitude Control MMH 34.571 5.857 40.42
APU Reactants
Fuel - Hydrazine . _34.73 .... 17.36 52.1
TOTALS ON BOARD
Fuel
MMH 59.5624
Hydrazine 52.1
Oxidizer
N204 54.001
Fuel cells will still contain liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen-quantities
unknown.
Payload hazards will vary due to different payloads for different missions.
These special hazards will not be known until mission is determined.
NOTE: First flights will have ejection seats on orbiter in event of a
mishap. Safing the ejection seats is a must.
BTOWING OPERATIONS
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TOWING OPERATIONS
FROM
LANDING SITE TO ORBITER PROCESSING FACILITY
When the orbiter has been deemed safe to move after landing at the
KSC landing site, it is planned to move it to the O.P.E. in a
©nvoy.
The Fire Services will support this move as a segment of the convoy
with apparatus and crew.
The assigned personnel and apparatus will proceed with the convoy
prepared to provide fire suppression/rescue actions for any emer-
gency which may occur to the convoy while enroute.
Fire personnel and apparatus will be ready for immediate response
from the nearest fire station to assist the fire personnel assigned
to the convoy, if needed.
Upon arrival at the Orbiter Processing Facility, the support will
be provided as described in Section C.
CORBITER PROCESSING FACILITY
ORBITER PROCESSING FACILITY
Hazardous Operations:
A. Safing of Hypergol Systems, OMS and RCS.
B. Safing of Ammonia System, TCS
C. Safing of Fuel Cells, LH2 and L02
D. Safing of ARS System, 02 and N2
E. Safe/Remove Pyrotechnic Devices
F. Remove/Replace Flight Batteries
G. Removal of Hypergol Pods
H. Removal of Payload (Depending on Payload)
I. TPS Tile Installation
During any of the above listed operations and any other hazardous operation
that will be associated with the preparation of the orbiter for transporting
to the Shuttle Vehicle Assembly Building, Fire Services personnel will be on
site equipped and prepared to provide fire suppression and rescue activities
as required.
Due to the installation of fire suppression systems and equipment in the OPF,
fire apparatus will not normally be required on site, but will be immediately
available at the nearest fire station for response with additional personnel
and equipment upon request.
DSPACE SHUTTLE VEHICLE ASSEMBLY BUILDING
SPACE SHUTTLE VEHICLE ASSEMBLY BUILDING
Hazardous Operations:
A. Stacking and Mating of the Orbiter and the Launch Vehicle
Systems
B. Ordnance Installation
C. Rollout to Launch Pad
A. Stacking and mating of the orbiter, external tank, solid rocket
boosters on the mobile platform.
Major support for operation in the Space Shuttle Vehicle Assembly
Building will be "in station" support with fire personnel and apparatus
ready to respond from the LC-39 fire station, if the need arises.
Fire personnel will be assigned to on-site support as required
for special conditions.
The facility installed fixed systems and equipment preclude the
need for fire apparatus and personnel on site to support normal operations
The fire personnel will remain in the LC-39 fire station, notified of the
operations in progress and alert for immediate response in theevent of a
mishap.
B. Ordnance Installation
Fire support for these operations will be "in station" support,
with fire personnel assigned to on-site support as required due to special
hazards.
Fire personnel and apparatus will normally remain in the LC-39
fire station, notified of the operation in progress and alert for immedi-
ate response in the event of a mishap.
C. Rollout of Shuttle Vehicle on Mobile Launcher Platform
Fire apparatus and crew will be assigned to support this operation
with on site standby, starting just prior to the time the crawler/transporter
is scheduled to enter the Space Shuttle Vehicle Assembly Building to proceed
under the mobile launcher platform.
As the crawler/transporter leaves the Space Shuttle Vehicle
Assembly Building carrying the space Shuttle to the launch pad, the
Fire Services will provi.de an escort, with personnel on the mobile
launcher platform and the crawler/transporter for immediate action,
if needed.
Fire personnel and apparatus stationed in the LC-39 fire station
will be notified of operations in progress and alert for immediate
m ponse to assist the personnel assigned to escort convoy if needed.
GLAUNCH COMPLEX ACTIVITIES
LAUNCH COMPLEX ACTIVITIES
These activities include but are not limited to:
A. Off-Loading LOX Into Storage Tank
B. Off-Loading LH2 into Storage Tank
C. Filing of GH2 Tube Banks
D. Various Maintenance, Removal, Replacement of Line Replacement
Units on Hypergol Equipment
E. Filling of Hypergol Storage Tank
F. Various Tests and Verification Operations of all Hazardous
Systems in Preparation for Launch Operations
Due to the number of operations that will be required to go on prior to
and during the limited tim e the Space Shuttle Vehicle will be on the
pad, the Fire Services is planning to use the area support concept.
Fire Services will provide apparatus and crew at the pad gate to support
be many operations on the pad.
Thepersonnel assigned to this standby will have communichtions with the
operational personnel.
In thetvent an emergency or mishap occurs, apparatus and crew will respond
to the site of the emergency on the pad.
Other apparatus and crew will be immediately dispatched from LC-39 fire
station to take over the area standby support position or assist the
fire personnel who responded to the emergency, if needed.
LAUNCH
LAUNCH
During launch countdown to launch,fire personnel and apparatus will be
assigned to fallback locations as required.
Personnel and equipment at the fallback areas will provide rescue/fire
suppression support in the event of a mishap during launch countdown.
All fire personnel will be trained and qualified to perform rescue
operations on the launch pad and launch vehicle and orbiter if the
reed arises.
At the scheduled time in the countdown, additional fire apparatus and
personnel will be assigned to standby at the landing site in the event
of an abort and the orbiter will be required to land.
After a successful launch, the fire personnel on standby at the fallback
area will become a part of the pad safing team and assist in determing
the launch pad is safe for support personnel to return to the pad to
start refurbishment in preparation ibr the next launch.
GOFF-LINE HYPERGOL MAINTENANCE
OPERATIONS
OFF-LINE HYPERGOL MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS
A number of facilities located in the Fluid Test Area are designated
for off-line hypergol maintenance operations.
4
Operations will be in progress in these facilities at the same time;
safing, refurbishing and preparing the hypergol pads, engines, and
associated units for the next scheduled orbiter.
The buildings in which the off-line hypergol operations are to take
place will have fixed automatic and remotely activated fire suppression
ad alarm systems.
The major portion of the operations that are to take place in these
facilities are planned to be handled remotely without personnel in
tie immediate area during the hazardous portion of the operation.
With the built-in protection and the remote function of the operation,
the major portion of support by Fire Services personnel will be "in
station."
Fire personnel and apparatus will remain in the Industrial Area Fire
Station, notified of the operations in progress, the facilities in-
volved in active operations, alert for immediate response in the event
of an emergency.
On-site support will be provided for rescue/fire suppression as required
when operating personnel are required to be in the immediate area during
hazardous portions of operations performed at these off-line hypergol
facilities.
HASSOCIATED OFF-LINE ACTIVITIES
ASSOCIATED OFF-LINE ACTIVITIES
These activities are the activities that require fire support due to
the hazards involved. Activities that would take place in the landing
area, Altitude Chambers, facilities designated for payload preparation,
flight crew systems facilities, and many other areas and facilities.
As these activities become more defined as to hazards, the individual
operations, location, and facilities will be addressed as to planned
support to be provided by the Fire Services.
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SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER
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SRB/ET AFT ATTACH
NOZZLE & TVC
AFT SKIRT&
LAUNCH SUPPORT
4 SEPARATION MOTORS
GROSS WT . . . . . . . 1,163,500 LB
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POSITION MLP IN INTEGRATION CELL
rITV  V T TIMOVE NO.1 AFT SEG TO VAB TRANSFER AISLE
LIFT NO. I AFT SEG & SECURE TO MLP
MOVE NO.2 AFT SEG TO VAB TRANSFER AISLE
LIFT NO.2 AFT SEG & SECURE TO MLP
MOVE NO.1-1 CENTER SEG TO VAB TRANSFER AISLE
ACK NO. 1-1 CENTER SEG
DECAY CKS
VIE N ,.ENTER SEG TO VAB TRANSFER AISL E
STACK NO.j-2 CENTER SEG
MOVE NO.2-I CENTER SEG TO VAB TRANSFER AISLE
SR OI TI NS
2 NO. 2- CENTER SEG
yvrN--.2-2 CENTER SEC TO VAB TRANSFER AISLE
STACK NO.2-2 CENTER SEG
MOVE NO.1 FWD SEG TO VAB TRANSFER AISLE!lSTACK . .O, IS0•. 11111I
MOVE NO.2 FWD SEG TO VAB TRANSFER AISLE
TACK NO.2 FWD SEG
SRM NO.1 & 2 ALIGN CKS
HY D S YS SERVI
INSTALL RACEWAY CABLES
RE-POWER ELEC CKS
VAB INTEGRATION CELL ,' POWER ON I I
III. & C CKS WITH LP 549 HRS
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POSITION, ALIGN & ATTACH I REMOVE ET/SRB FWD GSE ALIGNMENT PINS & INSTALL FWD BOLT
AFT ET/SRB STRUTS & TORQUE ALL AFT FITTINGS ASSBYS
ALIGN & TORQUE FWD ET/SRB ATTACH BOLTS I
INSTALL AFT ET/SRB ELECT CONNECTORS & CABLES
INSPECT MECH INTERFACE CONNECTIONS & HARDWARE
! ! DETACH &REMOVE-ET HANDLING SLING
DETACH & REMOVE ET/SRB FWD ATTACH POINT GUIDES
INSPECT ET/SRB ELECT CONNECTORS & CABLE iNSTAL
I REMOVE ET HANDLING SLING ADAPTERS
INSTALL RING FRAME BOLTS AT SLING ADAPTER MOUNTING LOCATIONS
INSPECT RING FRAME RING FRAME BOLTS AT SLING ADAPTER MOUNTING LOCATIONS
ET/SRB GROUNDING.CHECKS
COMPLETE INSPECTION i
REMOVE GSE LIGHTING m
I OPEN PLATFORMS
VAB FLOW REVISED
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
-i 1
O TOW TO VAB 1:00
J INSTALL ERECTION SLINGS 2:00
S RETRACT L NDING GEAR 2:00
SROTATE TO VERTICAL 1:00
J REMOVE AFT ERECTION HARDWARE 1:30
I
~.- TRANSFER TO INTEGRATION CELL 3: 0
MATE ORBITER TO ET 2:30
2 REMOVE FWD ERECTION SLING 3.30
L--3i -" 'CONNECT ORB/ET INTERFACES & VERIFY 10:00
. CONNECT RB/MLP INIERFACES & ERIFY 10:00
7 °.. SHUTTLE INTERFACE TEST 8:00
SCLEAR AREA 1:00
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43 44 45 46 47 48
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i111111 INSTALL SSME NOZZLE WEATHER PROT GSE 0:20.
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PAD FLO EN.T 3/8/74
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 ELAPSED TIME AT PAD-HOURS
IllIll IIII TRANSFER SSV FROM VAB TO PAD 7:00 "
A MLP HARD DOWN ON MOUNTS I I
1I111:1111111! 111II 1111111!1Ilt MATE FACILITY/ET PtCP SERVICE LINES 18:00
/I IilIll PURGE AND SAMPLE FACILITY LOX/LH2 SYSTEM 4:00
I 1 g1111'1 1 1 1 MATE MLP AND VEHICLE TO PAD AND VERIFY INTERFACES 8:00
II EXTEND PAYLOAD CHANGEOUT ROOM 0:30
l1111 llII 11ll HYPERGOLIC/HELIUM LOADING PREPS 11:00
A POWER ON
111111 1111111 LAUNCH READINESS VERIFICATION f;00
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',////X //, /// ///A HYPERGOLIC SERVICING 18:00
II CLEAR PAD 0:30
S7/ / ECLSS SERVICE 4:00
VA, 7 ET TANK CONDITIONING 4:00
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II OPEN PAD 0:30
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I RETRACTPCR 0:30
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